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In Action in Perception Alva Noë develops and presents a 
sensorimotor account of vision and of visual consciousness. 
According to such an account seeing (and indeed perceiving 
more generally) is analysed as a kind of skilful bodily 
activity. Such a view is consistent with the emerging 
emphasis, in both philosophy and cognitive science, on the 
critical role of embodiment in the construction of intelligent 
agency. I shall argue, however, that the full sensorimotor 
model faces three important challenges. The first is to 
negotiate a path between two prima facie unsatisfactory 
readings of the central claim that conscious perceptual 
experience is constituted by knowledge of patterns of 
sensorimotor dependence. The second is to convince us that 
the sensorimotor contribution, in such cases, is actually 
constitutive of perceptual experience rather than merely 
causally implicated in the origination of such experiencei. 
And the third is to respond to the important challenge raised 
by what I will dub 'sensorimotor summarizing' models of 
the relation between conscious experience and richly 
detailed sensorimotor routines. According to such modelsii 
conscious perceptual experience only rather indirectly 
reflects the rich detail of our actual sensorimotor 
engagements, which are instead lightly sampled as a coarse 
guide, optimized for planning and reasoning, and geared 





1.  The Central Claim 
 
Dance is, without doubt, a kind of skilful bodily activity. 
Subtract the body and its activity and – modulo only the 
severest forms of contemporary exploration – the dance 
itself must disappear from view. The central claim of Alva 
Noë's important, stylish and challenging treatment is that 
perception is more like dance than philosophers and 
cognitive scientists have (mostly
iii
) noticed. For like dance 
"perceiving is a kind of skilful bodily activity" (Noë (2004)iv 
p.2). What can this mean? 
 
 
It does not mean, merely, that you need a body (or at least, 
some sense organs and a brain) to perceive. Rather, it means 
that skilful bodily action and perception are intimately 
entangled. The key to this shared intimacy is the idea that 
conscious perceptual experience consists in a perceiver's 
implicit knowledge of 'sensorimotor contingencies': rules or 
regularities relating sensory inputs to movement, changes 
and action. Implicit knowledge of such contingencies 
typically amounts to having a set of expectations concerning 
the "way sensory stimulation varies as a result of movement" 
(75). Both the character (the 'what it is like' of vision, touch, 
hearing etc) and the contents (concerning space, color, shape 
etc) of our perceptual experiences are said to be determined 
by our implicit knowledge of SMC's (sensorimotor 
contingencies), or (as Noë now prefers to say) by our 
'sensorimotor expectations'). 
 
To illustrate this, consider a visually presented horizontal 
line and a looming ball heading at alarming velocity towards 
your face. These two distinct experiences correspond, on 
Noë's account, to two distinct signatures in sensorimotor 
space. Thus, if you move your eyes along the straight line, 
the retinal stimulation is invariant, whereas if you move 
your eyes up or down relative to the line, there is a sudden 
shift. A stationary ball would display a very different profile 
to this, while the moving ball presents a distinctive looming 
pattern that can (and probably should) be terminated by an 
act of ducking. The first claim, as I shall understand it, is that 
differences in what we perceptually experience correspond 
to differences in the sensorimotor signature associated with 
certain objects, properties and states of affairs. If two things 
look different, they do so because in encountering them we 
bring to bear (rightly or wrongly) different sets of 
sensorimotor expectations. But despite such differences, for 
all visually presented objects there will be some large parts 
of the sensorimotor signatures in common. It is these 
commonalities that make the experiences visual (rather than, 
say, auditory). For example, vision (unlike audition or touch) 
samples the front or facing sides of objects, and so on. The 
visual attributes of sensed objects are thus that subset of the 
signature sensorimotor contingencies that pertain to the 
distinctive ways that the visual sense can sample the real 
properties of objects. Thus, the very same real property (e.g. 
size) may be apprehended by vision or sometimes (for small 
objects) by touch. But the mode of sampling varies 
dramatically, and with it the associated sensorimotor 
contingencies. 
 
The visual properties of an object are, on this account, 
nothing but certain objective properties (e.g. size, shape and 
color) sampled in a distinctive way. Of course, some 
properties (such as color) are available to humans only via 
one modality (vision). But we can imagine e.g. color 
judgments made by a prosthetic sensor and reported via 
audible tones. What makes our normal experience of color 
visual thus remains the details of a certain mode of sampling. 
 
The central idea is thus that the contents and character of 
perceptual experience are determined by implicit knowledge 
of various types of what I am calling 'sensorimotor 
signature'. These signatures can include various elements, 
some having to do with the expected effects of our own 
movement on the input, others concerning the way changes 
to external conditions (lighting etc in the case of color) will 
affect the input. Some of the elements that enter into 
sensorimotor signatures thus turn on objective features of 
the world, while others turn on idiosyncratic features of our 
own sensory apparatus (the curve of the eyeball, the spacing 
of photoreceptive cells, etc). Uniting all the cases is the 
guiding idea that perceived content and character depends 
on expectancies concerning the future unfolding, under 
various conditions, of patterns of sensory stimulation. 
 
The first challenge can now be stated. What does it mean to 
speak of expectancies concerning the future unfolding of 
patterns of sensory stimulation? In particular, are we to 
understand 'expectancies concerning sensory stimulation'  as 
a personal or sub-personal phenomenon? It would be a 
personal level phenomenon if our expectancies concerned 
sensory experiences themselves (e.g. we expect the ball to (in 
one sense) look bigger and bigger as it approaches our 
head). It would be a sub-personal phenomenon if what was 
at issue was some neural network's being able to predict the 
increasing area of some pattern of sensory stimulation 
defined at, say, the retina. 
 
Both readings face difficulties. The first reading, as Noë (87, 
228) notes, courts circularity. It assumes we already have 
perceptual experiences of object appearances (e.g. the way 
the plate looks elliptical from an angle-see p.84) and then 
builds further kinds of content (e.g. the plate's also looking 
round) from our knowledge about how e.g. that elliptical 
look would vary as a result of movement around the plate. 
The experience of roundness just is, on this account, the 
active deployment of our implicit understanding of how the 
various looks would alter as a result of motion. 
 
Put like that, the story assumes 'ways things look visually' 
and does not explain them in any fundamental sense. 
Instead, what is explained is our grasp of a certain kind of 
visual content (roundness) on the basis of other kinds of 
visual content (regular variations in elliptical looks, etc). 
 
To avoid the threat of circularity, Noë suggests we should 
understand what it is to experience a look as nothing but our 
drawing on a certain set of more basic sensorimotor skills. 
The elliptical look of the plate is cashed out in terms of my 
ability to move my hand in a certain manner were I to try to 
indicate the shape as it appears in my visual field. Noë 
writes that 'In this way, my sensorimotor skill is drawn on to 
constitute my experience of the shape' (89). Looks are thus 
relations between the sensorimotor repertoire of embodied 
agents and objects. The virtue of this proposal is that it 
avoids a phenomenal (and hence circular) model of looks 
while (it seems) keeping the story operating at the personal 
level i.e. at the level of our actual understanding of our own 
sensorimotor space. 
 
The obvious drawback with this proposal is that it leaves it 
unexplained why knowledge concerning the relevant 
sensorimotor space should result in the experience of 
anything at all. Perhaps this gap can be filled (see Clark 
(2001) and Pettit (2003) for some attempts). But nothing in 
Noë's account appears apt to plug the gap. 
 
 
A second reading, more in line with the earlier account laid 
out by O'Regan and Noë (2001) would pitch the whole story 
at the sub-personal level. What is doing the work, on this 
reading, is knowing (non-consciously, implicitly) how the 
energy patterns impacting your sense organs will vary in 
response to your own actions and movements. (This is, I 
note, just the sort of knowledge that would be acquired by a 
simple recurrent neural network trained to predict the next 
sensory input from information concerning the present 
sensory state plus efferent copy of a motor command). This 
reading also avoids circularity (and hence was preferred in 
the earlier work- see Noë p.228) but seems to have been 
dropped in Noë's book because of a lack of 
'phenomenological aptness' (228). The worry seems to be 
that unconscious knowledge (of sensorimotor contingencies) 
provides no obvious basis for phenomenal consciousness, 
which is what Noë seeks to explain. But as we just saw, 
neither does the version that invokes actual experiences of 
looks. By offering an account apparently pitched at the 
personal level that nonetheless denies that it is trading in 
phenomenality as such (but only in our own grasp of our 
sensorimotor relations to objects), Noë may be hoping to 
somehow find a safe haven between the two readings. But I 
am not convinced that any stable intermediate line is 
actually displayed in the text. For either our own grasp of 
our sensorimotor relations to objects is something that 
figures in our experience or it is not. If it is, then the central 
claim looks circular (as an account of visual experience). If it 
is not, then we lose our grip on 'phenomenological aptness' 
and a gap looms between possessing these bodies of skill 
and actual visual experience. What is lacking is a persuasive 
account of why it is that certain patterns of sensorimotor 
knowing (understood in a staunchly non-experiential way) 
should make it the case that a creature has some form of 
perceptual experience. 
 
My own view is that as it stands, the account on offer is best 
viewed as a proposal concerning how conscious perceptual 
experiences get their contents, rather than an account of how 
there come to be conscious perceptual experiences at all. 
Considered in this light, we can perhaps say that experiences 
of looks get their content from our basic repertoires of 
sensorimotor skills (or orienting, grasping, pointing etc) 
while other experiences (e.g. seeing the top of the cup as 
circular rather than elliptical etc) get their content from our 
knowledge of how those looks will vary with motion and 
other conditions. But even considered as a story about 
content fixation, important challenges remain, as we shall 
now see. 
 
2. Constitutive Force? 
 
A specific dance, at some appropriate level of description, 
might plausibly be identified with a specific pattern of 
bodily motions. It may make no sense to suppose that one 
could know the dance without knowing something of those 
specific patterns of bodily motion. In this way, we espy 
something like a conceptual link between the dance and the 
details of it's embodied realization.  
 
At first blush, however, the link between our sensorimotor 
knowledge and skills and the contents of our perceptual 
experience looks less direct, as if the sensorimotor routines 
might be the hooks that reel in the contents, but in a merely 
causal fashion. The very same contents, one might well 
suspect, could be present in systems whose sensorimotor 
routines were very different to our own, or perhaps even in 
systems that were sensorimotor inert. I take it that these are 
the sorts of static internalist intuition that Noë (admirably) 
wants to unseat. 
 
One way to unseat them would be to embrace a radical 
option that Noë (p.89 and elsewhere) rejects, describing it as 
unacceptably behaviorist. The option would be to depict at 
least some basic forms of perceptual content as necessarily 
involving dispositions to act in certain ways (see Evans 
(1985) for a classic version of such a line). This seems 
plausible for e.g. certain egocentrically defined contents, 
such as that of a sound's appearing to come from over there. 
Entertaining such a content may in part consist in a swathe 
of dispositions to orient towards the sound. Subtract those 
dispositions to act and you must (if such an account is right) 
subtract the perceptual content itself. Noë depicts his own 
view in contrast to this, and as involving, in the case of a 
visually perceived flicker on the right, only 'practical 
knowledge of how movement would bring the thing into 
view' (89). 
 
By moving us squarely back into the realm of knowledge, 
however, Noë runs a risk of letting internalism in through 
the back door, and creates an internal tension between two 
components of his own account. 
 
One component is the oft-repeated idea that what counts are 
our expectations (or our implicit knowledge) concerning the 
way sensory stimulation will unfold. The other component is 
the idea that we try to bridge the explanatory gap (between 
physical goings-on and conscious experience) "by expanding 
our conception of the substrate in terms of which we hope to 
explain consciousness" (226). This expansion looks to the 
way neural activity supports embodied action as the missing 
linkv in explanations of perceptual consciousness. Here, the 
general claim is that "what determines phenomenology is 
not neural activity set up by stimulation as such, but the way 
the neural activity is embedded in a sensorimotor dynamic" 
(227). In this way: 
 
 
"Experience is not caused by and realized in the brain, 
although it depends causally on the brain. Experience is 
realized in the active life of the skillful animal. A 
neuroscience of perceptual consciousness must be an 
enactive neuroscience-that is, a neuroscience of 





But once again, it is not clear that Noë can have this both 
ways at once. If we are to avoid behaviorism by stressing the 
role of knowledge and expectations (concerning smc's), why 
isn’t that all 'in the brain'? How do we distinguish the radical 
gap-bridging view from the more conservative idea that the 
embodied activity is just a causal precondition of setting or 
re-setting parameters in neural structures that encode the 
kinds of knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies that Noë 
likes to stress? Once set (or reset) and activated, these neural 
structures do indeed (it might be argued) realize the 
conscious perceptual experience. Giving away still more, 
perhaps they realize the experience not in a snapshot 
moment but only in a temporal evolution. We would thus 
have a time-extended, sensorimotor knowledge constituted, 
but fully internal vehicle of the conscious experience. Such a 
temporal evolution might normally be causally scaffolded 
by real-world action and self-selected real-world input, but 
that need not always be the case (e.g. in dreams and vivid 
hallucinations). As far as I can see, nothing in the concrete 
cases described in the book favors Noë's radical account over 
the more conservative and internalist option just described 
(for example, both would predict and explain the key 
patterns of experiential plasticity, including the case of the 
qualitative similarity of vision and TVSS (tactile visual 
sensory substitution)). The appeal to knowing how (rather 
than knowing that) seems only to focus attention on a type 
of internally coded knowledge: one causally beholden to 
real-world embodied action but not conceptually tied up 
with it. 
 
It may be that Noë needs to bite (or at any rate sample) the 
behaviorist bullet, by arguing that nothing could count as the 
relevant know-how unless it supported certain dispositions 
to behave. But that would be to fall back on the Evans-style 
account that was explicitly rejected in chapter 3. In general, it 
seems to me that securing genuine constitutive force for 
knowledge of smc's in the construction of perceptual 
experience may indeed require some such move, behaviorist 
or not.  
 
 
3. Sensorimotor Summarizing. 
 
So far, I have been concerned with what might be seen as 
internal worries and tensions: ones arising within Noë's 
ambitious (and immensely illuminating and informative) 
account. I should finally confess, however, to harboring a 
deeper and darker suspicion. It is the suspicion that the full 
sensorimotor model is empirically flawed, in a way that 
distorts the true role of sensorimotor skills in the human 
cognition. It is, to put the matter starkly, the thought that 
conscious perception may be more akin to reason than to 
dance. 
 
The backdrop to this worry is work on the so-called 'dual 
visual systems hypothesis' (Milner and Goodale (1995)vi. 
According to this hypothesis, our capacities of conscious 
visual awareness (which they sometimes call capacities of 
visual perception and contrast with capacities for visually-
guided action) depend on a specific visual processing stream 
- the ventral stream - that is said to operate semi-
independently of the processing stream (the dorsal stream) 
that guides fine-tuned motor action in the here-and-now. 
The dorsal stream is thus said to be specialized for fluent 
motor interaction while the ventral stream deals with 
enduring object properties and subserves explicit 
recognition and semantic recall.  As a kind of corollary, the 
ventral stream is said to take over whenever the real-world 
object is not present-at-hand:  actions in respect of imagined 
or recalled objects are under ventral stream control (see 
Milner and Goodale (1995) pp. 136-138). Evidence for the 
ventral/dorsal dissociation comes in three main varieties: 
deficit data concerning patients with damage to areas in 
either the dorsal or ventral streams; performance data from 
normal human subjects (using experimental paradigms such 
as the Tichener Circles illusion); and computational 
conjectures concerning the inability of a single encoding to 
efficiently support both visual form recognition and 
visuomotor action. I shall not rehearse these bodies of 
evidence here (see Clark (1999) (2001)) but will instead locate 
the dual visual systems hypothesis in the wider setting of 
what I will now call "sensorimotor summarizing" accounts 
of the contents of conscious perceptual experience. 
 
Sensorimotor summarizing accounts depict the function of 
conscious visual perception as the delivery of various forms 
of optimized representation: representations optimized to 
aid performance in ecologically normal circumstances. In 
line with Milner and Goodale's emphasis on the neural 
division of visual labor, such accounts understand the 
relevant optimizations (in the case of ventrally dominated 
conscious visual perception) as ones geared to the role of visual 
information in planning, thought and reasoning, rather than the 
fine-grained (dorsally dominated) control of visuomotor 
action. In, for example, the Titchener Circles experiment, the 
conscious visual representations would be optimized (just as 
Milner and Goodale suggest) to guide the choice of which 
disc to pick up, and the choice of what kind of grip to deploy 
(one apt for picking up and not, e.g. for throwing). The 
conscious illusion (of one circle's being larger than another) 
may then be best explained by the visual system's delivering 
a representation enhanced in the light of information about 
relative size: a trick that is effective for reasoning and choice 
in most ecologically realistic situations, but that cannot be 
tolerated by fine sensorimotor control systems. 
 
Similarly, a study by Carrasco et al (2004) found that the 
allocation of attention affected the appearance of a visual 
stimulus, causing an enhanced contrast effect in a cued 
grating. Reporting on this effect Treue (2004) comments that: 
 
" Attention turns out to be another tool at the visual 
system's disposal to provide an organism with an 
optimized representation of the sensory input that 
emphasizes relevant details, even at the expense of a 
faithful representation of the sensory input" Treue 
(2004) p.436-437 
 
It is, in fact, a commonplace idea in contemporary 
neuroscience that conscious awareness is in general 
concerned with the provision of what Christof Koch (2004) 
terms 'executive summaries' apt to aid frontal regions in the 
selection of one among a set of possible types of action or 
response. Campbell's (2002) 'targets' view of consciousness, 
Jacob and Jeannerod's (2003) more nuanced version of the 
dual visual streams view, and Matthen's (2005) account of 
'descriptive sensory systems' all share something of the 
flavor of this kind of view. What all these views share is the 
image of conscious perceptual experience as reflecting the 
content of representations whose cognitive role is to enable 
the deliberate selection of actions and action types 
(including, and perhaps especially,  'epistemic actions' such 
as sorting, sifting, comparing and the like- see Pettit (2003), 
Matthen (2005)). Such representations need not, and on this 
account do not, typically reflect the full intricacies of our 
actual sensorimotor engagements with the world. Instead, 
they are optimized to inform reason, selection and choice, 
and thus reflect only the broad outlines of a space of possible 
targets and possible kinds of sensorimotor engagement.  
 
I do not claim that this view is correct, or even (as yet) 
sufficiently clearly articulated. I do think, however, that it is 
suggestive of an importantly different take on the role of 
detailed sensorimotor knowledge in the construction of 
perceptual experience. For if it is at all on the right track, 
then detailed sensorimotor knowledge may be buffered from 
the realm of conscious perceptual content, informing such 
contents only at a fairly high level of abstraction. If this is 
correct, then one of the most striking implications of the full 
sensorimotor model may be called into question. This is the 
claim that all differences in embodiment (insofar as they 
impact sensorimotor contingencies) must thereby make some 
difference to qualitative experience (27-28). This claim will 
turn out to be false if what structures experience is (not the 
full suite of sensorimotor details but) a kind of coarse 
summary whose main concern is with a space of targets and 
of action types. The sensorimotor summarizing view thus 
avoids the threat of 'sensorimotor chauvinism' (Clark and 
Toribio (2001)), leaving it an open empirical question to 
what extent (if any) sameness of experience requires 
sameness of embodiment. 
 
 
It may be, however, that neither the full sensorimotor 
summarizing view nor the full sensorimotor contingency 
view has the ability to capture all the layers and components 
of perceptual experience. Perhaps, that is, perceptual 
experience is not a unitary thing, whose contents are to be 
determined by a single suite of engagements or 
representations. Such a mixed view is in fact suggested (in 
different ways) by both Jacob and Jeannerod (2003) and by 
Matthen (2005). What still seems likely, even if this is so, is 
that conscious perception is sufficiently deeply bound up with 
reason and planning for those special needs to significantly 
impact and buffer the role of 'raw' knowledge of 




Conclusions: Dancing with Reasons 
 
 
I have raised three challenges for Noë-style sensorimotor 
contingency theory.  
 
The first challenge is to find a safe haven between two 
unsatisfactory readings of the central claim that perceptual 
experience is conditioned by expectancies concerning 
sensory stimulation. One reading looks circular, since it 
depicts the expectancies as already operating in the realm of 
experience. The other looks inadequate, since it depicts the 
expectancies as fully sub-personal (e.g. as concerning 
energetic impacts on sense organs) and fails to visibly bridge 
the ever-treacherous 'explanatory gap'. As an aside, I'd 
personally be strongly inclined to put my money on the 
latter reading, and to hope to tell some kind of additional 
story to (try to) dissolve the gap (see Pettit (2003) and Clark 
(2000) for examples of such stories). Interestingly, Noë (228) 
seems to opt for the former, thus leaving the account in the 
uncomfortable position of perhaps taking 'a little bit of 
consciousness for granted' (230)  
 
The second challenge is to fix the intended force of the 
central claim. Is the claim that there is a conceptual 
connection between sensorimotor knowing and the contents 
of perceptual experience? Intent to avoid (what he sees as) 
the behaviorism in Evans and others' appeals to actual 
dispositions to behave, Noë leaves this reader wondering 
whether anything less (such as Noë's cautious appeal to 
practical knowledge) can really secure more than a causal 
role for the sensorimotor loops themselves. 
 
The third challenge is to accommodate (or give principled 
reasons to reject) the fairly extensive empirical data 
suggesting that the contents of conscious visual experience 
are optimized for selection, choice and reason, and 
effectively dislocated from the representations that enable 
the fine control of action. Such optimization and dislocation 
threatens to introduce a buffer zone keeping detailed 
knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies at arms length 
from the day-to-day business of conscious perceptual 
experience. 
 
Challenges aside, Action in Perception is a wonderful 
achievement. Noë has produced a lucid, rich, elegant, and 
important work that raises a wide variety of truly central 




* Thanks to Ned Block, Susan Hurley, Josefa Toribio, 
Matthew Nudds, and Alva Noë for  illuminating discussions 
of the sensorimotor view. This project was completed thanks 
to teaching relief provided by Edinburgh University and by 
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i
  This point was brought home to me in several conversations with Ned Block, to whom 
this short treatment owes a special debt. 
 
ii See Milner and Goodale (1995),  Clark (1999), Clark (2001), Jacob and Jeannerod 
(2003) , Campbell (2002) and the interesting, multi-layered discussion in Matthen (2005) 
 
iii
 Exceptions include Merleau-Ponty (1945/62), Varela, Thompson  and Rosch (1991), 
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v
 I do not myself see how this move alone would bridge the explanatory gap, hence some 
of  my concerns in the previous section. 
 
vi
 Noë (p.19) rejects the suggestion that the 'dual visual streams' work raises problems for 
the sensorimotor view, on the grounds that (1) his story makes no claims about what 
conscious vision is for, and (2) that both dorsal and ventral activity depend on 
sensorimotor skills. The thought I want to explore is that the way sensorimotor 
information matters for conscious perception will be quite different if that information is 
first optimized for reasoning and planning, rather than accessed 'raw' and simply made 
available to reason and planning. 
